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INTRODUCTION
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) operates
on a platform that draws a distinction between professional and collegiate
athletics, also known as amateurism. For student athletes to maintain their
amateurism status, the NCAA forbids student athletes from receiving
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additional payments or benefits beyond education-related expenses, such
as tuition, room and board, and cost of attendance. Athletic boosters are
prevalent across college campuses nationwide and make generous
contributions to university athletic programs. However, the affluent
financial status of many of these boosters, as well as their close
relationship with the university, often leads to manipulation of the system.
Athletic boosters use their money and influence to sway universities in
their hiring decisions and to persuade prospective student athletes, or
current student athletes, to attend a particular institution. Third-party
boosters are the most problematic because they are beyond the university’s
control.
This Article draws parallels between agency law and the role of
athletic boosters in a university context. This Article suggests that
universities should not be held liable for the actions of third-party boosters
unless the university had knowledge of the booster’s conduct or lacked an
adequate system of internal controls.
The same conclusion is drawn in a criminal context, except the
scope of liability is narrower. If either a booster affiliated with the
university or a third-party booster engages in criminal activity, the booster
subjects himself or herself to punishment individually under the criminal
statutes of the state in which the university resides. Further, even if the
university had knowledge of the criminal acts of a booster, there is no duty
to report the booster so the university should still not be held liable. By
contrast, for non-criminal behavior, the university should only be held
liable for boosters affiliated with the institution, unless the knowledge
requirement is met or the university has a flawed system of internal
controls.
The ultimate issue then becomes whether a university should lose
all athletic perks, such as post-season play and scholarship money? And
should the answer change when a booster with a close relationship to the
university is either successful or unsuccessful in soliciting benefits from
student athletes without the university’s knowledge? This Article also
seeks to address the question of whether holding a university liable for the
criminal acts of its employees under NCAA rules is the same as holding
them liable for amateurism violations by boosters.
A major problem with third-party boosters is that the NCAA lacks
subpoena power and does not have jurisdiction to charge boosters. The
NCAA’s only right to recourse is through the institution itself. This is an
inefficient solution because the booster, the one that made the fake
contract and is responsible for the sanctions, walks away without
punishment and the innocent university is subject to sanctions. Public
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policy dictates that it would be unfair to hold the university and all the
innocent athletes liable for a third party’s actions; these innocent
individuals would suffer the consequences of misconduct, with which they
had nothing to do. While some state laws attempted to regulate the
unethical conduct of boosters, these laws are inadequate for resolving the
issue of booster liability as a heavy burden on the university. These laws
are also the subject of much critique because they allow the university to
benefit twice. First, the university obtains valuable recruits from the
booster’s efforts, and second, gets to recover for the penalties imposed.
However, the university does not completely recover because they will
only get a monetary award which does not make up for harsh penalties,
such as loss of post-season play. The university is also forced to incur more
litigation which involves extensive time and money. Further, universities
may be hesitant to sue a booster for fear of terminating that relationship
because of the on-going benefits they provide. The best solution would be
to sue the booster directly. The NCAA can obtain personal jurisdiction
over the booster through the states’ long-arm statutes or in the alternative,
by suing the university but requiring mandatory joinder of the booster in
the lawsuit based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a), or state
equivalent.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE NCAA AMATEURISM PLATFORM

The NCAA is an organization that regulates collegiate athletics.
Member institutions must abide by the NCAA’s regulations pertaining to
the eligibility requirements of student-athletes, as well as subject
themselves to the NCAA’s rule enforcement policies.1 Promoting
amateurism is at the core of the NCAA’s mission.2 The NCAA seeks to
maintain a clear distinction between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports in an effort to prevent the exploitation of student* Jennifer Lee, Staff Editor, Mississippi Law Journal; J.D. Candidate
2021, University of Mississippi School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Professor William Berry III for inspiring the production of this Article. The author
would also like to thank Amanda Lee and Sarah Schofield for their unwavering
support and critique of this Article.
1
J. Winston Busby, Playing For Love: Why the NCAA Rules Must
Require a Knowledge-Intent Element to Affect the Eligibility of Student-Athletes,
42 CUMB. L. REV. 135, 145 (2012) (“Under NCAA rules, the student-athletes, the
universities, university employees, and those ‘representing the institution's
athletics interests’ must comply with the NCAA ‘constitution, bylaws, and other
legislation of the Association.’”).
2
2019-2020 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL const. art II, 10 (2019)
(“Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport . . . .”).
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athletes3 by professional organizations and to even the playing field among
participating member institutions.4 As such, the NCAA forbids student
athletes from accepting any form of additional benefits beyond the
permitted scholarship which includes tuition, room, board, books, and cost
of attendance.5 Athletes who accept such impermissible benefits run the
risk of losing their amateurism status forever.6 The NCAA also strives to
preclude unethical recruiting procedures. Boosters who provide these
prohibited additional benefits to student athletes as a technique to persuade
the student to attend a particular university is one example of many
unethical recruiting practices.
In determining penalties when a violation of the NCAA bylaws
occurs, the NCAA considers whether the university was involved or if the
violation independently affected an individual student athlete.7 Examples
of potential violations include distributing a salary, gift, or discounted
services throughout the recruitment process or after a student athlete
enrolls at the university.8 Once the NCAA investigates a potential
violation and concludes that the violation did in fact transpire, the NCAA
may penalize the institution by placing it on probation, ordering a
reduction in the number of scholarships available, banning a sport from
post-season play, striking wins from a sports team’s record, or forbidding
the university from televising competitions.9

3

Id. (“[S]tudent-athletes should be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enterprises.”).
4
Id.
5
PAUL C. WEILER, ET AL., SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
PROBLEMS 720 (W. Acad., 6th ed. 2019) (explaining the NCAA’s opinion that
these expenses are related to education and therefore, do not compromise
amateurism).
6
Id. at 818 Note that losing one’s amateur status as a result of accepting
additional benefits applies to all universities across the country. Id. For example,
if a tennis player at Mississippi State accepts benefits, they will not only lose
eligibility to play at Mississippi State, but they can also compromise their
eligibility to compete at all other NCAA institutions across the U.S. Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
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ATHLETICS BOOSTERS’ INFLUENCE ON COLLEGIATE
SPORTS
A. THE ROLE OF ATHLETIC BOOSTERS

Athletic boosters generate significant contributions to collegiate
athletic programs all across the country and exert a large amount of
influence on the operation of these programs. For example, boosters
provide monetary donations “to influence hiring decisions, to claim
naming rights, or even to secure the opportunity to run on the field with
their institution's football team.”10 Unfortunately, while athletic boosters
do positively impact collegiate athletics, they frequently engage in
unethical conduct that violates NCAA regulations and compromises the
NCAA’s objective of promoting amateurism in collegiate athletics. In
accordance with the NCAA’s amateurism platform, boosters cannot
provide student athletes or prospective recruits with special treatment.
Boosters have a unique relationship with the university, and their insider
status puts them in a special position to abuse their “power” or influence,
by persuading a university to violate NCAA rules.11 It is human nature that
when universities are presented with generous donations and special perks,
the individuals in charge of the athletics operations easily succumb to the
booster’s demands.
The NCAA bylaws dictate that its member institutions “control
and are responsible for the conduct of their intercollegiate athletics
programs.”12 As such, a university may be liable for the actions of an
outside individual if that individual “promotes, assists, or enhances the
athletics interests” of the university.13 Therefore, the NCAA mandates that
member institutions take proactive steps to monitor and control the
behavior of its “representatives of athletics interests.”14 While NCAA rules
explicitly put universities in charge of boosters’ conduct,15 theoretically it
10

Sean Sheridan, Comment, Bite the Hand That Feeds: Holding
Athletics Boosters Accountable for Violations of NCAA Bylaws, 41 CAP. U. L.
REV. 1065, 1076 (2013).
11
Id.
12
Id. at 1079.
13
Id.
14
Id. ( “‘[A] representative of athletics interests’ can be an individual,
independent agency, corporate entity, or other organization… once a party has
been deemed a ‘representative of athletics interests,’ such party retains its status
as a booster indefinitely.”).
15
Id. at 1079–80 (“Under the definition supplied by the NCAA, . . . [a]n
institution is responsible for such a person or entity when a member of either the
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is the boosters who often control the universities’ conduct, using their
financial status as leverage.
B. REGULATION OF BOOSTER CONTACTS WITH
PROSPECTIVE AND ENROLLED STUDENT ATHLETES
The NCAA bylaws mandate that “[r]epresentatives of an
institution's athletics interests . . . are prohibited from making in-person,
on- or off-campus recruiting contacts, or written or telephonic
communications with a prospective student athlete or the prospective
student athlete's relatives or legal guardians.”16 Additionally,
representatives are prohibited from providing prospective student athletes
or their friends or relatives with any benefit, unless the benefit is available
to all of the university’s prospective students and families.17
Current student athletes are also forbidden from accepting “any
extra benefit,”18 which is defined as “any special arrangement by . . . a
representative of the institution's athletic interests to provide a studentathlete or the student-athlete's relative or friend a benefit not expressly
authorized by NCAA legislation.”19 Again, however, if there are benefits
that are available to the university’s entire student body, then student
athletes are permitted to receive these benefits as well.20

institution's executive athletics administration or athletics department knows or
should know that such party: (a) Has participated in or is a member of an agency
or organization . . . ; (b) Has made financial contributions to the athletics
department or to an athletics booster organization of that institution; (c) Has been
requested by the athletics department staff to assist in the recruitment of
prospective student-athletes or is assisting in the recruitment of prospective
student-athletes; (d) Has assisted or is assisting in providing benefits to enrolled
student-athletes or their families; or (e) Is otherwise involved in promoting the
institution's athletics program.” This definition indicates that knowledge is indeed
a requirement for holding a university liable, as well as active participation in the
misconduct by the university. Therefore, it follows that universities should not be
held responsible for the conduct of third-party boosters of whom the university
had no knowledge of and which behavior the university took no part in.).
16
Id. at 1080.
17
Id. at 1080–81.
18
Id. at 1081.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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C. PUNISHMENTS IMPOSED ON ATHLETIC BOOSTERS FOR
NCAA VIOLATIONS
Typically, state courts classify the relationship between a
university and student athlete as contractual in nature.21 As such, NCAA
member institutions are afforded a common law action for tortious
interference with contract against a party who attempts to infringe upon
the university’s contracts with their student athletes.22 To successfully
argue a tortious interference with contract claim, a university is required
to prove that “the conduct is intentional, it interferes with the contract—
usually, but not always, requiring that the defendant caused the party to
break the contract—the defendant knew that the contract existed, and the
plaintiff suffered some sort of pecuniary damages.”23 Most of the time,
universities are able to sue a booster under this cause of action since
boosters are aware that student athletes “are likely to have a scholarship,
financial aid agreement, or national letter of intent with their university”
and that meddling with that contract would culminate in a breach of
contract.24
A major violation25 of NCAA rules typically culminates in
pecuniary damages against an institution.26 Major violations typically
coincide with a lack of institutional control. Most offenses by boosters are
considered major violations.27 When boosters administer benefits to
enrolled student athletes, they “interfer[e] with the student-athlete’s

21

Id. at 1087.
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
WEILER, ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 761.
Examples of major violations include providing cash payments to prospective or
current student-athletes and entertaining these athletes with strippers as an
incentive to play for a certain university. Id.; see also Sheridan, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 1081–82 (“A major violation is any violation that is
not a secondary violation, specifically including violations that result in ‘an
extensive recruiting or competitive advantage.’” Examples of penalties for major
violations include: “a two-year probationary period, reduced recruiting activities
and financial aid awards, institutional recertification, and mandatory disciplinary
action taken against institutional staff members that knowingly violated or ratified
a major violation.”).
26
Sheridan, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1087.
27
Id. at 1082 (“That is, boosters generally commit infractions by
providing PSAs or current student-athletes with impermissible or extra benefits
to directly or indirectly obtain a significant recruiting advantage.”).
22
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contract with the university and are subject to suit.”28 However, the
boosters, who are responsible for the NCAA violations, receive minimal
punishments compared to the harsh penalties imposed on universities.29
The NCAA also found a lack of institutional control when
secondary violations30 occurred, such as when a booster affiliated with
University of Southern California’s (USC) athletic department provided
several prospective student athletes with free meals and entertainment.31
The NCAA subsequently punished USC with a four-year probation, a twoyear ban on football postseason play, and a significant reduction in the
number of football scholarships. The NCAA also required USC to return
money received from competing in post-season tournaments “and from
Pacific-10 Conference revenue sharing from post-season competition.”32
In comparison, the booster only received a letter from USC criticizing his
behavior and prohibiting him from providing future football recruits with
meals at his restaurant.33
Similarly, Ohio State University was charged with “failure to
monitor its football program” when two boosters, including one affiliated
with the university’s athletic department, furnished several of its football
players with additional cash payments.34 As a result, the NCAA enforced
a three-year probation on Ohio State’s football program, decreased the
number of scholarships, and banned the football team from post-season
play for a year.35 The booster, on the other hand, was only disassociated
from Ohio State for ten years.36
NCAA rules and state statutes fail to dissuade boosters from
violating NCAA regulations. The NCAA is only authorized to punish
boosters through disassociation from a university’s athletic program,

28

Id. at 1087–88.
Id. at 1091.
30
Id. at 1081 (explaining that a secondary violation is “a violation that is
isolated or inadvertent in nature, provides or is intended to provide only a minimal
recruiting, competitive or other advantage and does not include any significant
recruiting inducement or extra benefit”).
31
Id. at 1089.
32
Id. at 1090.
33
Id.
34
Id.at 1091.
35
Id.
36
Id. In other words, the booster could not provide nor accept any
benefits to or from the university and is prohibited from contacting any students
or employees. Id.
29
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which one scholar notes is “arguably meaningless.”37 Further, the NCAA
lacks subpoena power.38 Universities heavily depend upon booster
donations and are, therefore, hesitant to sue these boosters for tortious
interference with contract.39 Even though the booster’s actions negatively
impacted the university, universities believe that the risk of filing suit and
losing loyal contributors outweighs the benefits received from a damages
award.40 The lack of consequences attributed to boosters for their unethical
conduct fails to deter booster misconduct from recurring.
Additionally, most states are devoid of legislation imposing
penalties on boosters who violate NCAA rules. However, a few states
enacted laws that permit a university to bring a cause of action against
someone who violates an NCAA regulation. For example, a Texas statute
allows a university to sue an individual who violates an NCAA rule if: “(1)
The person knew or reasonably should have known that a rule was
violated; and (2) The violation of the rules is a contributing factor to
disciplinary action taken by the national collegiate athletic association
against the institution or a student at the institution.”41 This statute also
authorizes a regional collegiate athletic association to bring an action
against a person under similar criteria.42 Oklahoma also passed a bill
permitting the state’s public universities to sue a third-party actor who
“engages or conspires with another to engage in conduct in violation of
the rules of the governing authority that causes the educational institution
to incur sanctions by the governing authority or other economic penalties
or losses.”43

37

Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1095 (“[A]lthough the NCAA may require cooperation from
student-athletes, coaches, athletics department staff, and institutional personnel,
the NCAA cannot compel cooperation from outside individuals, including
boosters.”).
39
Id. at 1093.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 1088.
42
Id. However, NCAA employees, employees of a regional collegiate
athletic association, employees of a member institution of the regional collegiate
athletic association, and students at a member institution of the regional collegiate
athletic association are not held liable if they are the ones who commit the
violation. Id.
43
S. B. 425, 57th Sess. (Okla. 2019). This bill is often criticized for
allowing universities to “double dip.” In other words, the university gets to enjoy
all the benefits that a booster brings to its athletic program and then gets to sue
that booster when he gets caught by the NCAA. Id.
38
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III.

OVERVIEW OF AGENCY LAW

“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person
(a “principal”) manifests assent to another person (an “agent”) that the
agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”44
An agent is charged with either actual or apparent authority. An agent has
is given actual authority when the principal explicitly authorizes the agent
to “take action on the principal’s behalf.”45 Apparent authority is where a
principal indicates to a third party that the agent has the power to act on
their behalf with legal ramifications, and the third party relies in good faith
upon such authority.46 In other words, the third party reasonably believes
that the agent has such authority based on the representation the agent
made to the third party. For example, a principal may give an agent
business cards even though they have no authority to make decisions or
contracts. A reasonable person would think that someone who produces a
business card has the authority to act on behalf of the company.
The difference between an employee (agent) and an independent
contractor hinges on the employer’s ability to control. At common law, a
person is an employee if the employer had a right to “direct the manner of
performance of the employee’s duties.”47 In other words, the employer is
able to direct what the employee does, as well as how it will be done. In
contrast, an employer lacks this element of control over an independent
44

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY: AGENCY DEFINED § 1.01
(Westlaw 2006).
45
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY: CREATION OF ACTUAL
AUTHORITY § 3.01 (Westlaw 2006). See also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY: ACTUAL AUTHORITY § 2.01 (Westlaw 2006). (“An agent acts with
actual authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for
the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal's
manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”).
46
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY: APPARENT AUTHORITY§ 2.03
(Westlaw 2006). Creation of Apparent Authority. Note that apparent authority
renders a principal liable for its alleged agent’s actions, even though the agent was
not authorized to act in such a way, provided the third party reasonably believed
the agent did have the authority to act. Id. See also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY: APPARENT AUTHORITY § 2.03 (comment). While third party boosters
are not agents, this definition applies to individuals who appear to be agents even
though they are not. Id.
47
Patricia Davidson, The Definition of “Employee” Under Title VII:
Distinguishing Between Employees and Independent Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L.
REV. 203, 207 (1984).
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contractor.48 An employer can only direct the result of the independent
contractor’s work, “exercising little or no control over the execution of the
job.”49
The relationship of a rogue booster to an NCAA institution is
similar to an independent contractor–employer relationship. Unlike an
employee, a rogue booster operates according to his own procedures; he
runs an independent business enterprise. The rogue booster is not
technically affiliated with the institution and functions as he pleases.
Universities have no control over what the booster does, such as paying a
prospective recruit cash money to attend a particular institution or inviting
a recruit to elaborate parties, or how the booster goes about doing so, such
as slipping the recruit money in a dark parking lot. However, universities
can control the result of the booster’s activities. For example, the
university can report the booster’s conduct to the NCAA or declare the
recruit or student-athlete who accepted the benefits ineligible from
competition.
According to the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is
liable for the torts of its employees while they were “acting within the
scope of their employment.”50 Rogue boosters should not be recognized as
employees. Therefore, it follows that universities should not be held liable
for the booster’s tortious behavior. This is true even when both rogue
boosters and boosters affiliated with the institution commit criminal acts
because criminal behavior is not within the course and scope of
employment. In other words, it is not part of a booster’s job duties to
engage in criminal conduct.
In contrast, boosters who maintain a close relationship with the
university would be considered employees because the university has the
ability to control what they do, how they do it, and the result of their
actions. Thus, the doctrine of respondeat superior would apply in a
situation in which the university booster commits tortious conduct.
Additionally, “[i]f a principal is unjustly enriched at the expense
of another person by the action of an agent or a person who appears to be
an agent, the principal is subject to a claim for restitution by that person.”51
This concept is also applicable in the university-booster context. For
example, university A is unjustly enriched at the expense of university B,
such as obtaining a star athlete over university B due to the booster’s
impermissible influence, by the action of a person who appears to be an
48

Id.
Id.
50
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
51
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY: RESTITUTION OF BENEFIT § 2.07
(AM. LAW INST. 2006).
49
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agent, the booster. As a result, university B should be subject to a claim
for restitution by the NCAA on behalf of university A.52 In the sports law
framework, restitution would look a little different, however. The
disadvantaged institution would not directly recover; instead, the NCAA
would impose sanctions on the offending institution. This indirectly
benefits the university who was injured because a post-season ban, loss in
the number of scholarships available, athlete ineligibility, etc. would
decrease the competition between the two institutions as well as dispose
of any recruiting advantages. For example, suppose Mississippi State and
Ole Miss competed for a prospective football recruit and the recruit chose
Mississippi State due to additional cash payments he received from a
university booster. This violation was discovered and the NCAA banned
the Mississippi State football program from post-season play. If
Mississippi State had a better record than Ole Miss but was banned from
post-season play due to a recruiting violation, Ole Miss would then redeem
their chance to play in a bowl game.
The justification for establishing vicarious liability hinged on the
notion that “there are instances when the conduct of one person is so
closely controlled by or related to another individual that it makes sense
to link them for purposes of assessing liability.”53 This is comparable to
the public policy considerations behind why some states hold parents
vicariously liable for the misconduct of their children, reasoning that it is
the parents’ responsibility to supervise their child.54 As discussed above,
52

In fact, this is the current NCAA procedure in place. When a booster
commits a recruiting violation, the NCAA sanctions them, indirectly benefitting
all other competing universities. Imposing sanctions on a university for booster
misconduct is justified if the university had knowledge of the booster’s actions,
participated in this misconduct/acted as an accomplice of the booster, failed to
implement a monitoring and reporting system, or the booster was affiliated with
the university, invoking employment status. However, “restitution” for
institutions indirectly disadvantaged through NCAA sanctions on the offending
institution should not be allowed when a third-party booster is responsible for the
recruiting violation and the university was without knowledge but had established
an adequate system of internal controls.
53
Three Conditions Required for Respondeat Superior, THE LAW
DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/article/three-conditions-requiredrespondeat-superior/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2019); see also, 27 AM. JUR. 2d
Employment Relationship § 362 Intentional or Criminal Acts (“…an employer is
generally vicariously liable for an employee’s intentional tort when the act,
although not specifically authorized by the employer, is closely connected with
the servant's authorized duties”).
54
THE LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 53.
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independent contractors are not closely controlled by employers. In fact,
employers have minimal control over what they do. Independent
contractors work under their own direction and without supervision by the
party who hired them.55 Since vicarious liability is premised on the concept
of control, a university should not be held liable for the actions of thirdparty boosters as a university maintains no control over what boosters do.
They work under their own direction and without supervision by the
university. They provide money and benefits to student-athletes out of
pocket, not on behalf of the institution using university funds.
Further, third-party boosters do not have to show up to work at a
certain time or for a certain number of days. They can choose to meet up
with student-athletes according to their own schedule. The difficulty, or
rather impossibility, of meeting the requirements for proving an employer
is vicariously liable is further verification why universities should not be
held liable for the conduct of third-party boosters.
The party suing an employer for the actions of its employee must
prove that the individual was an employee when the harm ensued, the
employee acted within the scope of his or her employment,56 and the
employee’s actions benefitted the employer.57 A third-party booster’s
actions benefit the university, but the first two prongs of the test cannot be
satisfied. By law, independent contractors (third-party boosters) are not
categorized as employees, and therefore, third-party boosters cannot act
within the scope of their employment given their employment status is
nonexistent.
Moreover,
[a] person who purports to make a contract,
representation, or conveyance to or with a third party on
behalf of another person, lacking power to bind that
person, gives an implied warranty of authority to the third
55

Id. Independent contractors typically create their own schedules and
provide their own equipment. Id.
56
Garnett v. Remedi Seniorcare of Va., LLC, 892 F.3d 140 (4th Cir.
2018) (“As a general matter, an employer can only be held responsible for an
employee's misconduct if that conduct falls within the scope of employment. An
employee acts within the scope of employment when performing work assigned
by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the employer's
control”); see also, 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship § 362 Intentional or
Criminal Acts (“To be within the scope of employment, a violent act must be
committed within the scope of general authority of the employee, in furtherance
of the employer’s business, and for the accomplishment of an objective for which
the employee was hired”).
57
THE LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 53.
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party and is subject to liability to the third party for
damages for loss caused by breach of that warranty,
including loss of the benefit expected from performance
by the principal, unless (1) the principal or purported
principal ratifies the act as stated in § 4.01; or (2) the
person who purports to make the contract, representation,
or conveyance gives notice to the third party that no
warranty of authority is given; or (3) the third party knows
that the person who purports to make the contract,
representation, or conveyance acts without actual
authority.58
Similarly, a rogue booster who acts without authority to act on
behalf of the university to bind an athlete to a contract and forms a contract
with a prospective recruit or student athlete “gives an implied warranty of
authority” to the prospective recruit or student athlete.59 As such, the rogue
booster should be held liable to the prospective recruit or student athlete if
they are declared ineligible for college athletics as a result. However, if
the university authorizes the booster to engage in such behavior, the
university should be held liable. If the booster gives the prospective recruit
or student athlete notice that they are unauthorized to make the transaction,
i.e. giving cash payments, the prospective recruit or student athlete
assumes the risk of losing eligibility.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth held that:
(1) [an] employer is subject to vicarious liability for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor
with immediate or successively higher authority over
employee; (2) in those cases in which employee has
suffered no tangible job consequences as result of
supervisor's actions, employer may raise an affirmative
defense to liability or damages; and (3) affirmative
defense requires employer to show that it exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior and that employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive
58

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY: AGENT’S IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
AUTHORITY § 6.10 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
59
Id.
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or corrective opportunities provided or to avoid harm
otherwise.60
This situation is comparable to (1) a university being held
vicariously liable for the actions of its boosters creating a “hostile”
environment by engaging in unethical recruiting practices; (2) In situations
where a prospective recruit or already enrolled student athlete does not
actually accept the benefits, the university has suffered no consequences
as a result of the booster’s actions since they were unsuccessful so
sanctions cannot be imposed, and the university may raise a defense to
liability or damages (sanctions being imposed); (3) The university’s
defense would require them to show that it exercised reasonable care to
prevent (through internal policies and procedures and a system of
monitoring and reporting) and promptly correct any unethical recruiting
behavior61 (duty to report to NCAA).
In the Burlington62 case, the court also held that an employer can
be held “liable for both negligent and intentional torts committed by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment.”63 The Court further
stated that
although [the] supervisor's sexual harassment is outside
the scope of employment because the conduct was for
60

Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). The Supreme Court
in Burlington also ruled that the employer has an affirmative defense to vicarious
liability if the “employee has not suffered tangible job consequences.” Id. In a
situation involving an NCAA violation by a third-party booster, the university
would have an affirmative defense if they “exercise reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly” any unethical behavior. Id. In other words, the university
could assert a defense that they had a reasonable monitoring and reporting system
in place to catch behavior not in compliance with NCAA regulations. Id. Also, as
seen in the Alabama case, whenever the university is cooperative and promptly
corrects any misconduct, the NCAA is inclined to decrease the severity of the
punishment. Id. Further, the university can assert a defense if the third-party
booster also failed to avoid harm by abiding by NCAA rules and “failed to take
advantage of any…corrective opportunities.” Id. Reporting the violation to the
appropriate university staff member is an example of a corrective opportunity. Id.
The university must have policies and procedures in place for reporting NCAA
compliance issues. Id. As mentioned above, an adequate system of internal
controls should relieve the university of liability for third-party booster’s actions,
provided the university is without knowledge of the booster’s behavior. Id.
61
In situations where the university has promptly taken corrective action,
such as in the Alabama case, sanctions were mitigated.
62
Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. 742.
63
Id. at 756.
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personal motives, an employer can be liable, nonetheless,
where its own negligence is a cause of the harassment. An
employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if
it knew or should have known about the conduct and
failed to stop it.64
To begin, a rogue booster is not an employee, so theoretically, the
university would never be held liable. However, as the second part of the
Burlington Court’s opinion states, although the boosters’ actions are
outside the scope of employment, either because they are a third-party and
thus, not employees or because despite the fact that they are affiliated with
the university, their conduct was for the university’s own benefit, the
university can be liable if its own negligence (lack of institutional control)
is the cause of an amateurism violation; the university is liable with respect
to boosters if it knew or should have known, through an internal control
system, about the conduct and failed to stop it.
IV.

WHETHER UNIVERSITIES SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE
FOR AMATEURISM VIOLATIONS BY BOOSTERS

Universities should be held vicariously liable for amateurism
violations by boosters if the booster is affiliated with the university
because they meet the legal definition of “employee.”65 Members of
university booster clubs are affiliated with the university and indulge the
university with generous donations and promotion of its athletic
program.66 Further, the university has the ability to control the boosters’
64

Id. at 759.
THE LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 53 (“An employee is a person who
works in the service of another under express or implied contract for hire, under
which the employer has the right to control details of work performance”).
Boosters “work” for the university in the sense that they make financial
contributions and diligently promote the institution’s athletic program. The
university has the right to control certain aspects of their work performance based
on the NCAA bylaws. Id.
66
NCAA, Role of Boosters, NCAA ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ncaa.o
rg/enforcement/role-boosters (last visited "Month" "Day," "Year"). Depending
on the severity of the punishment, public policy dictates, due to the nature of the
relationship between the university and booster, that it is justifiable for the
university to be held liable for tortious conduct on behalf of the employee
(booster) because the university has deeper pockets. For example, in the Penn
65
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work through the university athletic department’s rules and regulations.67
For example, Michigan Tech allows boosters to provide occasional meals
for student athletes but restricts the boosters from giving out other
additional benefits.68 Boosters provide a benefit to the institution and
internal controls should be installed to monitor them.69
In contrast, universities should not be held liable for amateurism
violations by rogue, third-party boosters unless they had knowledge of the
booster’s existence.70 Holding otherwise would subject the university to
an undue burden.71 Third-party boosters are analogous to independent
State case, the NCAA imposed a $60 million fine on the institution. If damages
against a university employee are expected to accumulate in such large amounts,
the victim/s should be able to pursue a cause of action against the university since
the university is responsible for maintaining oversight of its employees. However,
if feasible, the individual responsible for the tort should be sought after first.
Associated Press, NCAA: State can keep Penn St. fine, ESPN (Sept. 8, 2014),
https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/11488374/ncaa-rules-statekeep-60-million-penn-state-fine.
67
Guidelines for Representatives of Athletic Interest, NCAA BYLAWS,
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Booster%20Guidelines%20with%20defi
nitions.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
68
Michigan Tech, NCAA Rules and Regulations Guidebook,
https:www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/mf-f-michigan-tech-booster-club.pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2019).
69
Garland ISD Booster Club Guidelines, GARLAND INDEP. SCH.
DISTRICT, https//www.garlandisd.net/file/10230 (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
70
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 6.4.1 (2019), https://web3.ncaa.org/l
sdbi/reports/getReport/90008. An institution’s ‘responsibility’ for the conduct of
its intercollegiate athletics program shall include responsibility for the acts of an
independent agency, corporate entity (e.g. apparel or equipment
manufacturer) or other organization when a member of the institution’s
executive or athletics administration, or an athletics department staff member, has
knowledge that such agency, corporate entity or other organization is promoting
the institution’s intercollegiate athletics program. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
Section 6.4.2 likewise applies this provision to individuals, subjecting
the university to liability for the actions of all third parties who engage in contacts
with a possible recruit. Id.
71
Sheridan, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1094. A
third-party’s actions are beyond the university’s control. As such, third-parties fall
outside the legal definition of an “employee.” Provided a reasonable monitoring
and reporting system is in place at the university, there is no justification for
holding the university liable because it is impossible to uncover every outside
individual’s unethical conduct, especially given the fact that most university
compliance departments consist of 3.5 members as compared to 500 enrolled
student athletes. The burden placed on universities to discover this behavior is too
great compared to the potential consequences of failure to detect. The worst that
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contractors, rather than employees. The work these boosters do is
unregulated by the university because often the university is not even
aware of their existence. Additionally, these boosters were not given
express or implied authority to act on behalf of the university in their
recruitment efforts. However, if the university had knowledge of the
booster and his or her illegal activity, the university may be held liable for
failure to report such action.
Every university should have an adequate system of internal
controls to act as a safeguard to protect against potential NCAA
violations.72 While a system of monitoring and reporting is not infallible,73
the fact that such a system is in place and has a reasonable likelihood of
detecting misconduct should be sufficient to avoid a penalty from the
NCAA for failure to detect the violation.74 A reasonable monitoring and
would happen is a prospective recruit chooses to attend the university the booster
is advocating on behalf of. While another university lost out due to lack of similar
resources (or failure to utilize such resources in an effort to comply with NCAA
bylaws), public policy rationale dictates that this is just another form of
competition. Perhaps the NCAA should encourage this type of competition and
allow boosters to indulge athletes with additional benefits. However, that issue is
beyond the scope of this comment.
72
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 67, at 3. The NCAA
Constitution section 2.8.1 actually mandates that every university monitor its
programs and report any NCAA violations to the NCAA. Id. An example of an
adequate system of internal controls is a university compliance office that
implements a monitoring system to track phone calls, expenses, meetings with
potential recruits, and other recruitment practices by their coaches. The
compliance department should also have a reporting system that highlights a
hierarchy of whom to contact for what offenses and ensures an atmosphere of
confidentiality. Id.; see also WEILER, ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 774 (noting that one issue in the Miami case was that the university
had no formal polices or procedures for staff members to “seek guidance on
compliance-related issues and report potential violations confidentially”). The
University of Miami case is an example of how a lack of oversight led to a failure
to detect telephone and text-messaging violations, which the NCAA attributed to
lack of institutional control. However, a system that regularly compares phone
logs and phone bills would prevent a situation like this from occurring.
73
Sheridan, supra note 10, at 1094. The NCAA even confesses “that it
is common for major investigations to uncover less than fifty percent of the actual
cheating occurring at a given institution.” Id. Therefore, it is unrealistic for the
NCAA to expect universities to uncover every single instance of booster
misconduct.
74
WEILER, ET AL., supra note 5, at 776. In fact, the NCAA implies this
in the Miami case. The NCAA explained that the university is responsible for the
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reporting system proved to protect the university from larger sanctions,75
or rendered the university devoid of all sanctions in its entirety.76 For
example, the NCAA Committee on Infractions (COI) declined to issue the
death penalty on Alabama for multiple violations, including paying
football recruits, despite the fact that they were a repeat violator.77 The
COI held that Alabama had made “great strides” after the initial violation
in creating “an environment of compliance.”78 The COI even applauded
Alabama for “its effective institutional control and proactive
compliance,”79 which is considered a mitigating factor when determining
punishment.80
In contrast, the NCAA imposed sanctions on the University of
Miami due, in large part, to lack of institutional control, which is
considered a Level I violation.81 This case involved a booster who was a
“known representative of the institution’s athletics interests” and
maintained a visible presence around the football and men’s basketball
programs.82 In a situation like this, the NCAA would have a legitimate
claim against the institution because they knowingly and intentionally
behavior of individuals in their athletics program if the university lacks adequate
compliance measures, or if they do not educate the student athletes and coaches
on compliance measures nor monitor the athletics program to protect against noncompliance. Id.
75
Id. at 771. Universities are subject to further sanctions, in addition to
the sanctions imposed for the violations themselves, if they are found at fault for
failing to exert institutional control. Id.
76
Id.
77
Lisa Horne, What the NCAA's "Improper Conduct" Means for USC
and Its Sanctions, BLEACHER REP. (Jan. 23, 2013), https://www.bleacherreport.c
om/articles/1498955-what-the-ncaas-improper-conduct-means-for-usc-and-itssanctions.
78
WEILER, ET AL., supra note 5, at 768.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 723. However, while demonstrating institutional control may
lessen the punishment imposed on an institution, it has not always gotten the
school off the hook. One example is the UNLV case. Even though the NCAA did
not find a lack of institutional control, UNLV was still held liable for major
violations of NCAA rules; the head basketball coach paid for a flight home for
one of his players and arranged for a professor to give one of his other players a
passing grade. The NCAA got it wrong in this case. The sound system of internal
monitoring and control should have been enough to save UNLV from receiving
sanctions. Id.
81
Id. at 781. In 2013, the NCAA began enforcing a new punishment
structure that comprised of four categories of violations. Level I violations
(Severe Breach of Contract), which includes a lack of institutional control, are
considered the most severe.
82
Id. at 771.
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turned the other cheek on this behavior.83 Further, two former assistant
football coaches (also former employees) were involved in providing the
extra inducements.84 The close relationship of these individuals to the
university,85 as well as their extremely visible presence at athletic events,
signaled a failure of the university to monitor its athletic programs86 and
the conduct of its boosters. Therefore, the NCAA imposed sanctions on
the University of Miami for a lack of institutional control.87 The NCAA
also imposed sanctions on the University of Arkansas88 and the University
of Central Florida89 for a lack of institutional control, again, involving
“insider boosters,” which are individuals who have a relationship with the
university and are involved in promoting its athletic agenda.90
Monitoring programs is also a good way to evaluate compliance
because the programs address, although still fail to completely resolve, the
proof problem. It is often difficult to prove whether someone truly had
83
Id. at 776. The NCAA maintains the position that universities are
responsible for the conduct of their athletics programs, which includes the
behavior of staff and individuals who represent the university’s athletic interests.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 778. The University of Miami named a student lounge after this
booster and granted him special access to it. He clearly did not “fly under the
radar.”
86
Id. at 773. The University of Miami took no measures to monitor text
messages and telephone calls, and none of the eight coaches or approximately 30
student athletes who committed these violations reported the misconduct. The
university also persuaded the booster to form a relationship with the football and
men’s basketball programs yet provided no oversight to ensure the booster was in
compliance with NCAA regulations.
87
“In assessing whether a member lacks institutional control, the
committee considers whether adequate compliance measures exist; whether those
compliance measures were appropriately conveyed to those who need to be aware
of them; whether the compliance measures are monitored to ensure they are
followed; and whether upon learning that a violation may have occurred, the
institution takes timely and appropriate action.” WEILER, ET AL., supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 773–74.
88
University of Arkansas, Case No. M183 (Apr. 17, 2003).
89
University of Central Florida, Case No. M361 (July 31, 2012).
90
The NCAA Committee on Infractions has noted that a booster’s insider
status creates a “greater university responsibility for any misconduct in which they
engage.” WEILER, ET AL., supra note 5, at 768. Thus, universities should be held
to a higher standard when boosters affiliated with the university commit recruiting
violations rather than when those violations are committed by third-party boosters
who are not under the university’s watchful eye at all times.
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knowledge of a situation. However, if there is a system in place that
monitors phone calls, for example, a university cannot feign ignorance
because the unethical behavior is documented.
In the Miami case, the COI said that “[b]ecause the institution
lacked an adequate monitoring system and had policies that were
disregarded or not communicated, it failed to establish a proper internal
monitoring system.”91 Communication is key. Even if there are policies
and procedures in place, these policies must also be communicated to
everyone in the university’s athletics department to be adequate.92 The
COI also said, however, that “[t]he committee has consistently concluded
that rules education alone is not enough.”93 In sum, a university needs to
both communicate the rules and provide training on how to recognize and
report misconduct, as well as have a monitoring system in place.
A. ANALYSIS OF THE NCAA’S RESPONSE TO AMATEURISM
VIOLATIONS BY BOOSTERS
Cam Newton was a quarterback at Auburn.94 It was later
discovered that Newton’s father had asked Mississippi State University
boosters for money when Mississippi State, a competitor, attempted to
recruit Newton.95 Newton, however, maintained his eligibility and status
as an amateur student athlete because he did not actually receive any
benefits from the boosters and there was not enough proof to indicate that
Newton or anyone from Auburn had knowledge of, or engaged in, the
91

WEILER, ET AL., supra note 5.
Universities should implement a training program for its athletic staff
similar to the process of attorneys receiving CLE credit for staying current with
the state of the law. The university should instruct all new athletics hires on
NCAA rules and the potential consequences for rules violations. The training
could include real world examples of situations in which universities were held
liable for the actions of its boosters and for turning a blind eye to the misconduct,
as well as hypotheticals, and proper solutions for how to best handle those types
of situations. The training should also include an ethics component, as one may
anticipate difficulty in having to report an NCAA violation and jeopardize the
athlete’s eligibility and the reputation of the university in the public eye. One may
also fear a deteriorating relationship with the university for deciding to report the
misconduct and subject the university to sanctions. Thus, a strong ethics training
program is essential. Finally, the training should include instructions on how to
report a violation, whom to report the violation to, and what types of conduct
constitute violations.
93
WEILER, ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 774.
94
Busby, supra note 1, at 136.
95
Id.
92
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solicitation by Newton’s father.96 The NCAA later clarified that “a
student-athlete cannot escape amateurism-eligibility violations simply by
claiming a lack of knowledge if impermissible benefits were actually
exchanged.”97 In other words, the fact that neither Newton’s father nor a
third party actually received any money was really the deciding factor in
choosing to reinstate Newton’s eligibility.98 As one scholar argued, a third
party’s unsuccessful attempt to solicit money without the student athlete’s
knowledge or consent should not result in the student athlete losing
amateur status or NCAA sanctions on the student athlete.99 This scholar
reasoned that:
The punishment—declaring a student-athlete ineligible to
compete—when the NCAA lacks the necessary evidence
to prove the student-athlete knowingly participated in a
violation compromises the organization's rules and is an
affront to the NCAA's mission. Punishing the studentathlete in this situation rips the principle of competing for
fun apart, unfairly punishes the athlete, and fails to further
the goals of combining fair play, scholarship, and
athletics.100
This argument is also applicable to the university,101 as it would
be unfair to punish a university for a third party’s actions without sufficient
evidence that the university knew about the illegal transaction.
While the above scholar did not address the issue of liability when
a student athlete actually accepts the benefits, the NCAA made clear that
accepting benefits will result in a loss of eligibility, regardless of
knowledge.102 Yet, the NCAA’s reasoning is faulty when it comes to
holding the university liable. Even if a student athlete accepts payment or
96

Id. at 165.
Id. at 139.
98
The NCAA held that “[p]ut simply, had Cam Newton’s father or a
third party actually received money or benefits for his recruitment, Cam Newton
would have been declared ineligible regardless of his lack of knowledge.” Id.
99
Busby, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 171.
100
Id.
101
Similar to how Cam Newton was determined eligible because neither
him nor anyone from Auburn was aware of, or participated in, the unethical
conduct, a university should be off the hook for liability, if no one at the university
was aware of, or participated in, the third-party booster’s conduct.
102
Busby, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 139.
97
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other benefits, if the university is without knowledge, the university should
not be held liable; only the individual student athlete should be punished
by loss of eligibility.103 The NCAA considers a series of mitigating factors
when determining whether to reinstate an athlete’s eligibility, including
“the assessed culpability of the student, the source of the benefits, and
whether benefits were actually received by the student.”104 The NCAA
should assess these factors in a university-booster context to determine
whether the university should be held liable. For instance, the NCAA
should consider whether there is evidence that the university had
knowledge of the booster’s activities, whether the benefits came from a
representative of the university’s athletic interests or a third-party booster,
and whether the benefits were actually received by the student. However,
while the determination of whether benefits were actually received by the
student is a factor to consider before making a decision to impose
punishment on an institution, that factor alone should not render an
institution liable when the university had no knowledge of the misconduct
and the misconduct was not committed by one of its agents.
In the University of Southern California case, Reggie Bush and
his family received thousands of dollars in additional benefits from sports
agents.105 The NCAA Committee on Infractions uncovered that an
assistant football coach was aware of the violations, yet still allowed
Reggie to continue to compete despite breaking the rules.106 The NCAA
held that universities must put forth diligent efforts to detect potential
NCAA rule violations; they “cannot simply ‘hide their heads in the
sand.’”107 The fact that the assistant football coach, acting as an agent of

103
While this technically is a punishment for the university because now
one of their sports programs is losing a star player, it is not unfairly punishing the
school and all other innocent athletes as a whole for the conduct of one single
person. Further, the university technically has a breach of contract cause of action
against the offending student athlete. However, suing a student is typically
frowned upon/unpopular because the “fallout could adversely affect the
institution’s reputation.” Sheridan, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
1084.
104
Busby, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 148.
105
Although sports agents play a different role than boosters, their
relationship to the university is comparable, and the purpose of this example is to
demonstrate how a university’s knowledge of NCAA violations contributes to a
finding of fault. See Kyle Bonagura, What to Know About Todd McNair vs. the
NCAA, ESPN (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.espn.com/collegefootball/story/_/id/
23201815/todd-mcnair-vs-ncaa-reggie-bush-scandal-faq.
106
Id.
107
Busby, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 146.
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the university, knew about the violations led the NCAA to conclude that
USC “failed to maintain ‘institutional control.’”108
The situation at USC differs from Cam Newton’s case because,
there, the coach had a blatant disregard for the rules and had knowledge of
the violations, yet let it slide.109 However, a rules violation committed by
a rogue booster and student athlete should not automatically draw the
conclusion that there was a lack of institutional control because, practically
speaking, it is impossible to detect everything. As long as the university
installs a reasonable monitoring system and reporting policies and
procedures, thereby making an effort, the university should not be held
liable for overlooking a violation, especially if it was committed by an
outside third-party that the university has no reason to know of and has no
presence on campus. An institution’s culpability should be determined
based on whether it had knowledge of the offense and/or the intent to
commit the offense and cover it up. Even if a university representative is
not involved, a violation committed solely by the student athlete that is
brought to the university’s attention should still trigger liability, if the
university fails to report the offense to the NCAA.110
Further, the university runs the risk of falling prey to the death
penalty, if repeat violations by boosters go undetected, as in the SMU
case.111 Although in this case the boosters were affiliated with SMU, since
universities are supposedly also liable for rogue boosters under current
NCAA doctrine, the same result-death penalty-would technically occur.
The NCAA should amend its policy for handing out the death penalty
when the repeat violator is a third-party booster committing such
violations without the university’s knowledge. The NCAA needs to draw
a clear distinction between university-affiliated boosters and third-party
boosters, as well as adopt a knowledge requirement, when determining
punishment for a university.

108

Id.
Id.; see also Bonagura, supra note 105.
110
The NCAA constitution actually requires that each university monitor
its programs to ensure compliance and to identify and report to the NCAA any
instances where compliance has not been achieved. WEILER, ET AL., supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 773.
111
WEILER, ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 761.
109
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1. SOLUTION FOR HOLDING BOOSTERS ACCOUNTABLE
FOR AMATEURISM VIOLATIONS
If the university had knowledge112 of the booster’s illegal
activities, the NCAA is justified in imposing sanctions on the university,
but the NCAA is without authority to sue the booster individually.113 The
NCAA’s lack of jurisdiction over boosters is especially problematic in
situations involving third-party boosters who violated NCAA rules
without the university’s knowledge. However, the NCAA will be able to
establish specific personal jurisdiction over the booster according to the
state’s long-arm statute.114 This prevents the booster from evading

112

Busby, supra note 1, at 174 (stating that knowledge includes having
an awareness that the activity is going on but refusing to intervene and stop the
misconduct from occurring, as well as “knowledgeable participation” which
“means, but is not limited to, acting in concert with any individual in a scheme or
plan to actively solicit compensation in exchange for an athletics scholarship”).
113
Id. at 172 (“The NCAA does not have the authority to punish an
independent third party—the actual rule violator—for selling or attempting to sell
a student-athlete to a university. Thus, the NCAA's only recourse is to punish the
school or the student-athlete.”).
114
All states have a long-arm statute which allows the state to obtain
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. While these statutes vary
slightly by state, most states have adopted the Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act, 13 U.L.A. § 1.03 (1980), verbatim. See, e.g., 13 D.C. Code § 13423 (1973). Although this Uniform Act was withdrawn from recommendation for
enactment by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1977 due to it being obsolete, many states have still incorporated its language
into their state statutes. This Act provides that:
[A] court may exercise jurisdiction over a person, who
acts directly or by agent, as to a cause of action or claim for
relief arising from the person's causing tortious injury in (1)
transacting any business in the state; (2) contracting to supply
services or things in the state; (3) causing tortious injury in the
state by an act or omission outside the state if the person
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state;
or (4) having an interest in using, or possessing real property in
this state; or (5) contracting to insure any person, property, or
risk located within the state at the time of contracting.
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States that have not adopted the language of this Act verbatim modeled
their statutes off of it and have similar criteria, such as permitting jurisdiction to
arise when an out-of-state defendant commits a tort within the state. Further,
courts have been fairly lenient with the long-arm statutes. See, e.g., Gray v. Am.
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961), where the court
held that the Illinois long-arm statute extended to cover a nonresident defendant
with no connection to the state other than that he acted negligently out of state,
which caused injury within the state.
As applied to a third-party booster, the state can utilize its long-arm
statute when:
[T]he tortious act or omission takes place without the
state but the injury occurs within the state and there is some
other reasonable connection between the state and the
defendant. A sufficient nexus exists if (a) the defendant
regularly advertises his products or services in the state or (b)
carries on some other continuous course of activity there or (c)
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or
from services rendered in the state. It is not necessary that this
activity amount to the doing of business. . . . [T]he regular
solicitation of business or the persistent course of conduct
required by section 1.03(a)(4) need have no relationship to the
act or failure to act that caused the injury.
Waters v. Deutz Corp., 479 A.2d 273, 275 (Del. 1984). So, if the booster
lives in Mississippi but provides payment to a football player at The University
of Alabama, the tortious interference with contract took place in Alabama. Thus,
the booster can be sued in Alabama state court. Similar to a court’s assertion of
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream
of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the
forum state, a court should be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over a booster
who serves the market for intercollegiate athletics by soliciting athletes across the
country with the expectation that these prospective student-athletes will accept
the benefits and attend the booster’s institution of choice in the forum state. Once
the court determines that the long-arm statute satisfies personal jurisdiction
according to the particular facts of the case, the court must consider whether the
exercise of jurisdiction violates due process. “Due process requires that ‘if (a
defendant) be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Transportes Aereos de
Angola v. Ronair, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 858, 865 (D. Del. 1982) (quoting Int’l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Obtaining jurisdiction over a
booster through the use of a long-arm statute satisfies due process because the
booster would have minimum contacts with the state in that the booster attempted
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punishment. Using a state’s long-arm statute to sue a third-party booster is
the preferred method for holding these boosters accountable because that
would allow the NCAA to sue the booster directly and avoid involving the
innocent university.
In the event the university is deemed to have had knowledge of
the recruiting violations or the violations were the result of conduct by a
university-affiliated booster, the booster can be brought into the NCAA’s
lawsuit against the university pursuant to Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (or state equivalent). This rule requires joinder of
parties if one party’s absence prevent complete relief among the existing
parties or that party has an interest in the subject matter of the suit.115
Another option to hold the booster accountable in this scenario would be
to, or in fact actually did, form a contract with either a prospective or current
student athlete. Therefore, the booster, who purposely availed himself of the
benefits and protections of the state should expect that he could potentially be
subject to suit in such state in which he solicits payments or other benefits to
athletes. “[I]t is reasonable and just to require him to litigate a dispute arising
therefrom in that state.” 544 F. Supp. at 865. The booster committed a tort—
tortious interference with contract—in the forum state. Thus, the NCAA can get
jurisdiction over the booster based on the state’s long-arm statute (committed a
tort within the state) and due process is preserved due to minimum contacts with
the state.
115
Fᴇᴅ. R. Cɪᴠ. P. 19(a)(1).
A person who is subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject matter
jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord
complete relief among existing parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the
person's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the
person's ability to protect the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
Id. See also, Who Must Be Joined in Action as Person "Needed for Just
Adjudication" Under Rule 19(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.L.R.
Fed. 765 (“The joinder of tortfeasors does not present a problem under [Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 19(a), because the Rule does not change the
established principle that joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, and that
any one may be sued alone.”). Therefore, the booster, who committed a tort by
interfering with the university, should be joined.
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for the university to file a crossclaim.116 Filing a crossclaim against the
booster is not ideal, however, as it allows the university to profit twice
from the booster’s illegal actions.117 First, the university obtains a star
athlete for its athletic program thanks to the booster’s persuasive
techniques. Not only does the university win the athlete, but potential
monetary damages from the booster if it triumphs on its crossclaim. In
essence, the university is reimbursed for the money it paid the NCAA,
which appears to defeat the purpose of the punishment. However, that is
not exactly the case.
When the NCAA finds a university liable for an amateurism
violation, it imposes a range of penalties depending on the severity of the
violation and whether it was a first-time offense. Potential penalties
include post-season bans and limits on the number of scholarships a certain
sports team may give out per year. These penalties cannot be redeemed
from money alone; they often “have long-term, adverse effects on athletic
programs”118 and damage the university’s reputation. While the
university’s opportunity to sue the booster technically gives “no
punishment” to the university since it gains the star athlete and gets to
recover from the booster, monetary damages cannot undo post-season ban
or loss of eligibility damage,119 so technically the university still does lose.
This situation is comparable to a wrongful death suit. While it is significant
that the decedent’s family receives money as compensation for the loss of
their loved one’s life, money does not bring the decedent back to life—it
116

Fᴇᴅ. R. Cɪᴠ. P. 22(a)(2) (“A defendant exposed to similar liability
may seek interpleader through a crossclaim or counterclaim.”).
117
Some states, such as Arkansas and Oklahoma, already have laws
providing the university with a cause of action against boosters. A common
critique of these laws is that they allow the university to benefit twice—the
university gets the star recruit from the booster’s efforts and also gets reimbursed
for the NCAA penalties imposed on the institution. However, as mentioned above,
if the university gets paid in damages for non-monetary penalties, such as a postseason ban, that money does not make up for the implications resulting from a
post-season ban such as loss of recruits and publicity; technically, the university
still is not made whole.
118
Sheridan, supra note 10, at 1098 (quoting Uɴɪꜰ. Aᴛʜʟᴇᴛᴇ Aɢᴇɴᴛꜱ Aᴄᴛ
prefatory note, 7 Part IB U.L.A. 55 (2000)).
119
Post-season bans hurt the publicity of the university because it loses
media attention and the potential to win money if it competes well. Such a ban
also has the potential to dissuade future students and student-athletes from coming
to the university because they know in advance that they will be ineligible for
post-season play. Finally, if a star athlete loses eligibility, the team may start
losing games and bad records cannot be undone.
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is not the same. This is the same scenario for boosters. While it is
beneficial that the university gets money damages, that does not allow its
team to play in a bowl game. The university has still not fully recovered.
In sum, whether it be through a long-arm statute, joinder rules, or by
crossclaim, the booster will be held accountable to the NCAA or university
in some respect.
2. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN BOOSTERS COMMIT CRIMES
If a booster commits a criminal act, the university should still not
be held liable for the booster’s actions, even if the university had
knowledge of the misconduct and failed to intervene to prevent the
conduct from occurring. The victims would have a state law cause of
action against the booster120 pursuant to its criminal statutes. Similar to
how a Walmart employee may be charged with a crime yet the company
as a whole is not sanctioned, it is best to rely on the criminal justice system
to impose punishment solely on the booster. The justification for leaving
the university out of the criminal proceedings stems from the doctrine of
respondeat superior, which only applies to an employee’s tortious
conduct. Thus, the university should not be held liable for the criminal
behavior of boosters, regardless of whether they are affiliated with the
university or not.121
On the other hand, if the university was somehow involved in the
illegal activity or sought to cover up a booster’s illegal conduct, the
university should be held liable as an accomplice or co-conspirator. The
NCAA should still not be allowed to impose sanctions, however; the
university should instead be subject to the criminal statutes of the state in
which the university resides. For example, the NCAA discovered that a
120

Sheridan, supra note 10, at 1078 (quoting Uɴɪꜰ. Aᴛʜʟᴇᴛᴇ Aɢᴇɴᴛꜱ Aᴄᴛ
prefatory note, 7 Part IB U.L.A. 55 (2000)). This applies to both boosters affiliated
with the university and third parties.
121
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). If
the booster is affiliated with the university, he or she is an employee. However,
the doctrine of respondeat superior only applies to tortious behavior. For a thirdparty booster, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply at all, and the
university is never held liable for their behavior (unless the university had
knowledge of the behavior), whether it be tortious or criminal. Although the
doctrine of respondeat superior still does not apply when a university has
knowledge of a third-party booster’s misconduct (knowledge does not suddenly
make boosters employees), the university can be held liable. At that point, the
university is not in compliance with NCAA bylaws which mandate a duty to
report NCAA violations. Technically, the university itself has then committed a
violation, and therefore the NCAA is justified in imposing sanctions.
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former Penn State assistant football coach had sexually molested young
boys.122 Upon further investigation, evidence that some Penn State
employees were aware of this criminal conduct, yet neglected to disclose
any information pertaining to the sexual abuse, was also uncovered.123 In
this situation, the NCAA did impose sanctions upon Penn State. A better
way to resolve this disturbing and tragic state of affairs would have been
to charge the individual university employees who had knowledge of the
abuse with criminal punishment pursuant to the Pennsylvania criminal
code.
3. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THIS PROPOSAL
Critics of this proposal may argue that in the event the NCAA is
without authority to sue an independent booster, universities should have
a cause of action against those boosters for the harm caused to the
institution as a result of the booster’s actions. Scholars argued that
permitting the university to bring a cause of action against a booster would
discourage universities from suing student athletes.124 This solution is far
from ideal since the university is permitted to reap the benefits of the
booster’s misconduct and receive compensation if the booster gets caught.
However, by requiring mandatory joinder of the booster through Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a), the NCAA would be able to sue the thirdparty booster along with the university. This eliminates the need for a
cause of action against the booster by the university, thus circumventing
the double-dipping mentality.
Mandatory joinder through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)
also bypasses the issue of university reluctance to sue a booster in the
hopes of retaining their benefits in the future because the booster is now
required to join the lawsuit irrespective of the university’s desire to bring
them in or not. Mandatory joinder is a way to ensure the booster is held
accountable yet avoid making the university look like the bad guy. In
situations with third-party boosters, the courts can get jurisdiction over
them through the state’s long-arm statute and thus the NCAA sues them
directly. This promotes equity—it would avoid involving the university in
actions by boosters, of which it had no control over and no knowledge.

122

Wᴇɪʟᴇʀ ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 782.
Id. at 783.
124
See Sheridan, supra note 10, at 1084 (asserting that suing studentathletes is frowned upon).
123

2020

LIABILITY REDEFINED

183

Another potential criticism of this proposal is that by the
time the lawsuit gets resolved or the booster’s identity is even discovered,
the athlete who received the improper benefits may have already
completed his or her eligibility and may no longer be a student at the
university. In this situation, the athlete suffers no consequences, but the
booster will still be held liable through mandatory joinder if the NCAA
sues the university for failure to comply with NCAA rules and regulations
based on that booster’s conduct if the booster is a repeat offender. If the
booster is not a repeat offender, whether the booster can be sued would
depend on the state’s statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION
The NCCA should consider the university’s culpability before
imposing punishment. A knowledge or intent element should be required
before liability attaches. Universities must knowingly violate amateurism
rules in order to be held liable by the NCAA. Even if it is not directly
involved in the recruitment scheme, a university knowingly violates this
rule if it is aware of a third-party booster’s bribery and fails to take action,
which would therefore hold it liable to the NCAA. By turning the other
cheek, the university submits to acceptance of the unethical behavior. This
situation parallels the concept of willful blindness125 in a criminal case.
For example, if a defendant has reason to suspect that the package the
defendant is delivering contains drugs, the defendant cannot be relieved of
liability based on the defense of “I never opened the box so I had no idea
what its contents were.”
On the other hand, if the university did not know about the booster
and the university’s reasonable diligence failed to uncover the booster,126
then the university should be exempt from liability for the booster’s
actions. However, the NCAA currently does not have authority to punish
the booster; its only right to recourse is through the university, but it would
not be fair to punish the university and innocent athletes for the
wrongdoing of a third-party. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) and
long-arm statutes resolve this problem by dragging the rogue booster into
litigation.
125

Jonathan L. Marcus, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful
Blindness, 102 Yale L. J. 2231, 2235 (June 1993). Willful blindness is a term of
art in criminal law that allows the court to find a mens rea of “knowing” even
though the offender was merely being reckless. Id.
126
Every university should have a monitoring and reporting system in
place to detect unethical and illegal behavior by university employees, as well as
from outside threats, such as rogue boosters.
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To prevent the rogue booster from walking away without
consequence, the universities’ oversight and monitoring programs should
be comprised of an internal policy for how they will handle third parties
and punish them. Since rogue boosters provide a benefit for the university
by bringing it star athletes, universities will be reluctant to sue them. If the
boosters face no consequences, they will continue to operate
unethically.127 The universities’ internal policies detailing what to do
when a rogue booster is discovered will act as an initial, though arguably
weak, safeguard against this problem.
Another safeguard in place is the undesirability of both potential
outcomes. The university is aware of the rogue booster but decides to take
the risk of avoiding detection and eventually is discovered by the NCAA,
subjecting the university to sanctions. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
19(a) would then mandate that the booster be brought into the lawsuit. Or,
the university is unaware of the booster’s existence but the student athlete
who accepted additional benefits loses eligibility to compete. In this
situation, the university has a state law cause of action against the rogue
booster for tortious interference with contract. Both of these outcomes
serve to deter booster misconduct.

127

Sheridan, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1095 (The
booster in the University of Miami case stated, “I did it because I could. . . . And
because nobody stepped in to stop me”) (quoting Charles Robinson, Renegade
Miami Football Booster Spells Out Illicit Benefits to Players, Yᴀʜᴏᴏ! Sᴘᴏʀᴛꜱ
(Aug. 16, 2011), https://sports.yahoo.com/news/renegade-miami-footballbooster-spells-213700753--spt.html).

